The paper extends the Revelation Principle to sequential common agency games under asymmetric information. Each period a principal contracts with a common agent. An implemented allocation is observed by other principals. Depending on whether the message reported by the agent to a principal is observed by other principals, we distinguish between private and public communication. Under private communication, the Revelation Principle applies, but optimal contracts are stochastic. However, the dimension of the support of an equilibrium contract does not exceed the number of types that achieve this stage with a positive probability. Under public communication, the reporting strategy of agent is stochastic, but the true type is reported with a positive probability. We demonstrate that the two regimes are equivalent in that they result in the same distribution of allocations. The results hold when the agent's type is not persistent, or the outcome of the contract is observed with noise.
under asymmetric information about agent's preferences. At each stage one principal o¤ers a contract to the agent. The implementation of the contract results in allocation which is observed by the other principals. An allocation is payo¤ relevant for all the principals and the agent, and may a¤ect the feasible sets of allocations of subsequent principals.
The framework we study applies to many economic environments. Examples include: (i) non-exclusive credit, where information sharing between creditors a¤ects the amount of credit and the probability of debt repayment (Padilla and Pagano (1997) , Pagano and Jappelli (1993) , Sharpe (1990) ); (ii) interaction of public and private health insurance programs, which a¤ects the choice of the insured and the terms of contract of the private insurer (Culter and Gruber (1996) ); (iii) retail industries such as supermarkets, airlines, credit cards, where the information about the purchase history of customers allows sellers to o¤er personalized deals (Acquisti and Varian (2002) , Chen and Zhang (2001) , Taylor (2002) , Villas-Boas (1999)); and (iv) certi…cation intermediaries, where information disclosure by an intermediary a¤ects the size and the distribution of the surplus between the buyer and the seller (Lizzeri (1999) , Peyrache and Quesada (2004) ), (v) interaction between …rm's …nancing and production decisions, where the choice of …nancial structure a¤ects …rm's position vis-a-vis its competitors (Gertner, Gibbons and Scharfstein (1988) , Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983) ).
Although the above applications provide useful insights, in most of them either there is no strategic role for principals, due to competition assumption, for example, or the analysis is restricted to very particular institutional arrangements such as linear contracts. As a result, the predictions are very sensitive to assumptions of a particular model.
One possible reason for the lack of a uni…ed, general approach is that the Revelation Principle 1 widely used to study contractual relationships under asymmetric information, may not be valid in the environments with more than one principal. The standard Revelation Principle states that when a principal contracts with agents under asymmetric information about agents'preferences, any contract can be described by a direct incentive compatible mechanism in which the terms of the contracts are based on the agent's report on its private information, and the agent has incentives to report the information thruth-fully. The practical application of this result is that the optimal contract can be found by the means of optimal programming subject to incentive compatibility constraints. Extending the Revelation Principle to games with many principals can be problematic. The literature started by analyzing common agency games in which the principals o¤er contracts simultaneously to the agent(s). Epstein and Peters (1999) characterize the universal message space that can be used to characterize any indirect mechanism. However, this message space may not be practical. The reason is that in such situation each principal would like to make its contract dependent on the contracts o¤ered by the other principals, leading to the problem of in…nite regress. As a result the simplest message space needed to describe the mechanisms must be rather rich, and is hard to work with. When principals o¤er contracts in a sequential manner, the problem of in…nite regress does not arise: Once a principal and an agent implement a contract, the principal cannot improve her payo¤ by requesting information about subsequent o¤ers. This paper is related to two other recent papers in the literature. When the outcome of contracting between a principal and an agent is not observed by the other principals, Pavan and Calzolari (2006) show that the equilibria can be described within the message space that includes agent's types and the allocations implemented with the preceding principals. On the contrary, we consider sequential common agency games with public contracts in which the contract and the outcome of the contract, that is, the allocation implemented at each stage, are observable by the other principals. This framework is a better description of economic environments mentioned above. Also it leads to a di¤erent type of externality that a contract between a principal and an agent exerts on the other principals: The implemented allocation itself becomes a signal about agent's private information. In this respect the paper is closely related to work on dynamic principal -agent relationships under imperfect commitment of Bester and Strausz (2001) . We show that techniques developed in Bester and Strausz can be applied to study a dynamic contracting problem with many principals, or any combination of single principal -agent relationships under imperfect commitment and multiprincipal relationships. In this respect we provide a generalization of Bester and Strausz result.
We study general communication mechanisms in which, without loss of generality, a contract is composed of a message space and a decision rule. The agent sends a message from the speci…ed message set and, based on the message, a principal commits to a (possibly stochastic) contract that implements a feasible allocation. All principals are free to choose the message spaces and decision rules, which may in particular be state dependant.
In general there are three elements that can signal agent's private information to subsequent principals: the mechanism, its outcome, and the message reported by the agent. Thus we distinguish between the cases of public and private communication. Under private communication, the message reported by the agent to one principal is not observed by the other principals. Under public communication, the principals also observe the information submitted by the agent to preceding principals.
The main result of the paper is that the set of equilibrium allocations of the sequential common agency game can be characterized within the type space. Naturally, the agent's incentives to report private information to a principal depend crucially on whether this report is observed by the other principals.
Under private communication, the agent is not concerned that his report to one principal may a¤ect the contracting choices with the other principals. As a result, the standard version of the Revelation Principle applies at each stage game. At the same time, deterministic contracts are suboptimal. Indeed, assigning a distinct allocation to each type implies that the outcome of the contract is a perfect signal about agent's type to the other principals. By o¤ering a lottery a principal can limit the information about the agent's type revealed by the outcome of the contract. Thus, an optimal contract of a principal is a menu of lotteries designed for each type of agent. However, this result does not imply any restrictions on the structure of the lottery. Next, we study the structure of an optimal lottery and show that the dimension of its support does not exceed the number of types that reach a given stage with a positive probability. Therefore, an optimal contract can be characterized as a menu of lotteries over a …nite support. Consequently, an optimal contract can be found as a solution to an optimization problem.
Under public communication, the revelation of private information by the agent may be costly for both the principal and the agent. The reason is that this information can be used by other principals in the subsequent stages. A similar problem arises when a single principal contracts with an agent over a number of periods. As new information about the agent becomes available during the relationship, the principal and the agent may …nd it mutually bene…cial to renegotiate the initial long term contract. However, anticipating the renegotiation of the initial contract, the agent may become less prompt to reveal its private information. This ultimately increases the cost for the principal of inducing a truthful report. As a result, the principal may prefer to decrease the informativeness of the agent's report about its private information. Bester and Strausz (2001) analyze this situation and establish that the equilibria of the game can be characterized using direct mechanisms in which it is an optimal strategy for the agent to report its type. In contrast with the standard Revelation Principal, however, the agent does not necessarily reveal its private information with probability one: It may be bene…cial for both parties that the agent randomizes and misreports its information with some probability. In this paper we show that the technique developed by Bester and Strausz (2001) can be extended to sequential common agency games with public communication. This is because at each contracting stage, the principal, be it the same or a di¤erent one, with possibly a di¤erent objective at each state, is constrained to o¤er allocations that belong to the Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the continuation game. The main di¤erence between our framework and that of imperfect commitment is that a principal does not internalize the impact of its contract on subsequent stages, and out-of-equilibrium messages may be needed to preserve the equilibrium outcome. However, we show that these messages can be preserved by the means of a direct mechanism.
We compare the set of equilibria under private and public communication. We show that the two sets are equivalent in a sense that for each type of agent they induce the same probability distribution of allocations. The main idea of this result is that a principal can generate the same belief about agent's type for subsequent principals either by designing a lottery on the set of the messages, as under public communication, or the set of implemented allocation, as under private communication.
The characterization results of the paper also apply to situations when the type of agent is not persistent over time, and when the messages or allocations are observed with some exogenous noise. In these case this information must be incorporated in de…nition of the Bayes rule, but the equilibria can still be studied within the type space.
Our result is weaker than the Revelation Principle of Epstein and Peters as it holds only for equilibrium mechanisms while the later paper constructs a language to characterize all the mechanisms of the game. However, we believe that it provides a useful tool to study many applications. A useful practical feature of our result is that, like in single principalagent mechanism design problems under asymmetric information, it allows to state the sequential contracting problem as a sequence of programming problems in each of which a principal maximizes its expected payo¤ under incentive compatibility constraints.
In the next section we present an example that illustrates the main features of the result. In section 3 we set up the model of the sequential common agency. Then in sections 5 and 4 we establish the Revelation Principle for the case of private and public communication. Section 8 concludes.
Example
In this section we present a simple example of sequential contracting that illustrates the issues addressed in the paper. Two manufacturers, P 1 and P 2 , contract sequentially with a common supplier A for provision of an essential input. The manufacturers produce two goods that they sell on di¤erent downstream markets. The contracting game lasts for two periods. Each period i = 1; 2 P i contracts with A for the provision of a quantity of input q i 0 at price t i that allows him to produce at most q i units of a …nal good. Denote C i = (q i ; t i ) the contract between the P i and A. The outcome of the contract between P 1 and A is observed by P 2 who makes an o¤er in the beginning of second stage. The inverse demand function in P i 's downstream market is P (q i ) = 1 q i :
The supplier produces an input at constant marginal cost which is her private information. It may be a low cost with probability or a high cost with probability 1 , where 0 < < 1 and > 0. The pro…t made with P i equals u i = t i q i , so A's total pro…t from serving the two manufactures is u = u 1 + u 2 . The pro…t of each manufacturer is v i = (1 q i )q i t i .
In the absence of information asymmetries about the cost the contracting decisions of manufacturers are independent. Each P i captures all the joint surplus with A by o¤ering a contract t i = q i and producing an e¢ cient quantity
(1 ):
(1 ) 2 , and A gets no rent, u 1 = u 2 = 0.
When the cost of the supplier is not known to the manufacturers, each manufacturer would like to screen the supplier in order to base his market strategy on the cost. However, in an otherwise symmetric situation, by observing the outcome of contracting between P 1 and A, P 2 receives an additional signal about the supplier resulting in updated beliefs = Pr( j C 1 ): This information is valuable for P 2 but may be disadvantageous for A. By decreasing the uncertainty of P 2 about A, P 1 allows P 2 to extract a bigger share of their joint surplus. Thus, to reveal any information to P 1 , A has to be compensated for the loss of the information advantage with P 2 . This information externality between the two contracts increases the cost of information revelation for P 1 . It thus a¤ects P 1 's trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and the informational rents. This leads to the question: How much information P 1 would like to acquire from A?
For example, P 1 may abstain from revealing (and learning) any information by o¤ering a single contract for both types of cost. As a result, P 1 does not incur the cost of information revelation, but ignores the supplier's cost. To be accepted by both types, P 1 must pay at least t = q. Then, regardless the type, P 1 produces the e¢ cient quantity for high cost q and leaves to a low cost A a positive rent u = q . The pro…t of P 1 under this contract is v (1 ) 2 ; which corresponds to the pro…t of dealing with a high cost A under full information. Obviously, this contract has high e¢ ciency costs due to the low production level asked from a low cost supplier. Under this contract, the outcome of the …rst stage provides no new information to P 2 , who thus contracts with A under the prior belief = : The best contract for P 2 is a screening mechanism that makes the production contingent on the value of the cost. To induce the low cost type to reveal her information, P 2 has to leave her the rent that she can obtain by overstating the cost. The contract of P 2 must therefore satisfy the following incentive compatibility condition:
The optimal trade o¤ between rent extraction and e¢ ciency (see La¤ont and Martimort (2002) ) results in a downward distortion in the output q 2 :
and a positive rent for the low cost A: u = q . The total rent of the low cost A is thus u P = u + u , where P stands for pooling.
Alternatively, P 1 can design a contract with distinct outcomes for each type of A. Then the outcome of the …rst stage allows P 2 to infer perfectly the type of A, implying that A gains no rent at the second stage. To induce her to reveal the information, P 1 must therefore compensate A for the rent she could obtain by overstating the cost in each of the two stages. If a low cost A selects the contract designed for the high cost type, P 2 is persuaded that he is facing a high cost supplier. This strategy allows A to gain u at the second stage, and u at the …rst stage. Therefore, the total cost of information revelation to P 1 under separating contract equals to u S = u + u .
The bene…t of information for P 1 is the e¢ ciency gains of production: P 1 produces an e¢ cient quantity q when dealing with a low cost supplier, and a conditionally e¢ cient quantity q when dealing with a high cost supplier. The pro…t of P 1 is v
(1 )
The two examples of contracts presented illustrate how the information externality a¤ects the equilibria of the game. Also it suggest that the ability of P 1 to alter the information transmitted to P 2 a¤ects the incentives of A to reveal it to P 1 . Then the natural questions are: What is the optimal degree of revelation? and What is the best strategy for P 1 ; in the absence of any ad hoc restrictions on the class of contracts from which he can choose.
The model
We consider a dynamic game between N principals, P 1 ; :::; P N , and a single agent, A. There are N stages. At each stage P i contracts with A over an allocation x i 2 X i . The outcome of the contracting game de…nes an allocation x = (x 1 ; :::; x N ) 2 X = X 1 ::: X N ; where all X i , i = 1; :::; N are assumed to be metric spaces. Denote x i (x 1 ; :::; x i ) the outcomes of contracting up to period i and x + i+1 (x i+1 ; :::; x N ) the outcomes of contracting from period i + 1 till period N: The decisions of principals P 1 ; :::,P i may restrict the feasible choice of principal P i+1 . To account for this feature we assume that once P i implements allocation x i , the feasible choice of P i+1 is restricted to F i+1 (x i ); where
The agent has ex-ante private information about its type 2 = ( 1 ; :::; T ), where 2 T < 1 that is persistent through N stages. In Section 7 we show how the results extend to the case of non-persistent private information. The prior distribution of types, = ( 1 ; :::; T ), with t > 0 for t = 1; :::; T and P t t = 1; is common knowledge. Denote i the set of types that play at stage i with a positive probability.
We consider communication mechanisms (contracts) which are functions from messages to probability distributions over feasible allocations: A mechanism of principal P i , i ; consists of a message space M i and a decision rule i ( ): For each message m i 2 M i ; P i commits to a decision i (m) 2 i ; where i is the set of probability distributions over F i (x i 1 ). M i is assumed to be a metric space, and M i denotes the Borel algebra on M i : The decision is a measurable mapping i : M i ! i : Denote i ( 1 ; :::; i ) the mechanisms proposed by principals P 1 ; :::,P i .
The strategy of P i is the choice of a mechanism i . Contracts are incomplete in that P i cannot contingent its contract on the decisions taken by the other principals P i . The agent's strategy at stage i is a message to P i . Formally it is described by a mapping from the type-contract space to the space S i of probability measures over M i ; i : 1 ::: i 1 ! S i . Denote i t i;t and note that i 2 S i : Also denote i = t i;t and note that i 2 i : The payo¤ of P i depends on the allocation x and on the type of agent t . Denote v i;t (x j ) the payo¤ of P i at stage j when the agent is of type t . It should be emphasized that P i controls directly only the allocation x i . However, x i may have an indirect impact on allocations x + i+1 through two channels: by a¤ecting the feasible choice of P + i+1 and by changing the perception of P + i+1 about the agent's type. The payo¤ of P i at stage i equals to v i;t (x i ), and his overall payo¤ is
Similarly, the payo¤ of the agent t at stage i is u i;t (x i ), so its overall payo¤ is given by
The functions v i ( ) and u i ( ); i = 1; :::; N are continuous and bounded on their domains.
The timing of the game is the following:
The agent learns its type 2 :
At each stage i; i = 1; :::; N , P i o¤ers A to play i ; that results in allocation x i :
Once i is played, principal P i+1 observes information I i on past contracting activities (I i is speci…ed below) and updates beliefs about the agent's private information to p i .
At stage N + 1 the game ends.
The information of the agent at stage i consists of its type , the mechanisms i o¤ered by P i , the pro…le of messages m i 1 (m 1 ; :::; m i 1 ) sent to P i 1 ; and the pro…le of outcomes x i 1 realized at stages 1; :::; i 1: Denote h For example, at i = 2;
The information of P i at stage i; I i ; has at most three components. The …rst one is the sequence of mechanisms i ( 1 ; :::; i ) that were o¤ered by the preceding principals P i . The second one is the sequence of allocations that resulted from these mechanisms, x i . Finally, the third one is the sequence of messages that were communicated by the agent to the preceding principals P i 1 , m i . We assume that i and x i become common knowledge at stage i. For the sequence of messages we distinguish between public and private communication. Under public communication, P i observes all the messages that has been sent by the agent to the preceding principals P i . In this case the history of the game for P i is
Given that P i observes the sequence of messages m i 1 , it can also infer the decisions i 1 that were implemented by P i 1 : Under private communication, the message reported by A to P i is their private information: Then the history of P i is
that is, it is composed only of the pro…le of mechanisms o¤ered by the preceding principals and the pro…le of the realized allocations. Denote ( ; ) ( i ; i ) N i=1 the strategy pro…le for the principals and the agent in the game = f 1 ; :::; N g, (
N k=i the strategy pro…le at stages k = i; :::; N , and ( i ; i ) ( k ; k ) i k=1 the strategy pro…le at stages k = 1; :::; i.
The observed history h i results in updating of beliefs concerning the type of the agent. The posterior belief of P i is a measurable mapping p i :
is the set of probability distributions over i .
At stage i, P i faces a history h i (P i ) and a state (x i 1 ; p i ); and o¤ers a mechanism i : The outcome of the mechanism i determines the history h i+1 (P i+1 ) and the beliefs p i+1 : I i ! P , resulting in the subsequent state (x i ; p i+1 ):
We study the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game.
De…nition 1 A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game consists of a pro…le ( ; ) and beliefs ( ; p 1 ; :::; p N 1 ) that satisfy the following three conditions:
impact on the continuation game
2. Optimality of : The reporting strategy of A is optimal at each stage i, anticipating its impact on the continuation game
3. Bayes rule. The posterior belief of P i is consistent with the Bayes rule, described below in (4) and (5).
Let us consider a given (possibly state dependant) sequence of message spaces M . For all types t that play at stage i with a positive probability, p i;t > 0; the expected payo¤s of P i contracting with type t , and the payo¤ of A are, respectively,
Then the expected payo¤ of P i at state
The objective of P i is to choose i , p i and i to maximize her expected payo¤ (2) subject to three constraints: First, the agent's reporting strategy is optimal, anticipating its impact on the subsequent states:
Second, the mechanisms o¤ered by subsequent principals belong to PBE of the game, that is,
Third, for all types in i , the belief of P i+1 is consistent with the Bayes rule. The de…nition of the Bayes rule depends on the information available to P i+1 : Under private communication, the belief of P i+1 is derived from the mechanisms i , the behavioral strategy of the agent i and the allocations implemented at previous stages, x i . The Bayes rule in this case writes:
Under public communication, in addition to i ; x i and i , P i+1 observes the message m i reported by the agent to P i . Thus the Bayes rule writes:
To interpret (5), divide each side of the expression by i (H) > 0. Then the left hand side represents the belief of P i+1 to face a type t upon receiving a message from the set H. The right hand side is the conditional probability that A is of type t when A follows the reporting strategy i and the message from the set H is realized 2 . The only di¤erence in (4) is that a principal updates beliefs upon observing realized allocations instead of messages.
Our objective is to construct a set of tractable mechanisms that provide the same payo¤ for all the players as the original game . For this reason, we introduce some further de…nitions that permit to order mechanisms in terms of payo¤s obtained by P i and A. We say that (x i 1 ; i ; p i+1 ; i ;
is an optimal strategy of the agent, so it satis…es (3), and p i+1 is derived from the Bayes rule (4) or (5), depending on the communication mode.
and U i;t (x i 1 ;
In the rest of the paper we will analyze how a given equilibrium pro…le ( ; ) of the game with unrestricted message spaces relates to an equilibrium pro…le of the game in which the principals are restricted to use messages form the type space : The classical result of the mechanism design is the Revelation Principle which states that the two equilibria sets are equivalent. In terms of above de…nitions, the standard Revelation Principle can be stated as follows.
) are payo¤-equivalent. Moreover, it is an optimal strategy for the agent to reveal its type, t ( t ) = 1 for all t 2 .
The intuition behind the standard Revelation Principle is that the principal can replicate the behavior of the agent by combining two functions : ! M and : M ! (X) to a single function d : ! (X). Then the mechanism d induces the same probability distribution over allocations as the original mechanism with the reporting strategy . The reason why the Revelation Principle cannot be applied directly to the game with many principals is that each principal P i can commit only to its own mechanism i ; and not to the whole game = ( 1 ; :::; N ): (At the same time, when P i contracts with the agent, its contract induces a continuation game with an outcome that can be characterized as a PBE.) In the following two sections we establish the Revelation Principle for the cases of public and private communication.
4 Public Communication
The Revelation Principle
In this section we characterize the equilibria of the game under public communication.
When the agent contracts with a principal under public communication, the report sent to P i is observed by all P + i . Therefore, when selecting its reporting strategy, the agent is concerned not only with the impact of the report on the decision of P i , but also of all the subsequent principals. It implies that communication at each stage cannot be considered independently as under private communication.
Another feature of this setting is that all the information transmitted by the agent to P i by the means of message m i is revealed directly to P + i . If P i …nds it bene…cial to preserve some uncertainty about the agent's type for the subsequent principals, this strategy cannot be achieved when the agent reports its type truthfully. In the example of Section 2, if the supplier submits a truthful report about her type, P 2 becomes perfectly informed. Note that o¤ering a stochastic contract does not provide the remedy against full revelation because the lottery is assigned after A submits the report to P 1 , and therefore, after P 2 learns the type. Hence, if P 1 prefers to control the information revealed to P 2 , there must be at least some types that follow a non-degenerate stochastic reporting strategy.
It may seem that the characterization of the implementable allocations faces a serious problem because there can be mechanisms that are not supported by the direct incentive compatible mechanism. However, the information that a principal aims to infer from the agent through the communication mechanism is only the agent's type. The reason why the direct revelation mechanism may not support the principal's optimal mechanism is that a truthful deterministic report on the type can be suboptimal. One way to circumvent this problem is to reduce the informativeness of the report about the type. In other words, the agent must be allowed to misreport its private information with some probability. Then communication strategy itself becomes stochastic. However, randomizing over the type space is su¢ cient to generate any belief for P + i+1 , and the equilibria of the game can still be characterized within the type space:
To provide a formal proof of the argument, we apply the technique developed by Bester and Strausz (2001) who study a general problem of contracting under imperfect commitment in a long term principal -agent relationship. They show that any optimal mechanism can be characterized within the class of direct mechanisms in which an agent reports its true type with a positive probability. To reduce the cost of information revelation, the principal commits to a gradual learning policy.
The major di¤erence between contracting under imperfect commitment and sequential contracting with many principals is that the objectives of di¤erent principals are not aligned. Each principal does not internalize the externality that its contract imposes on the other principals. However, this di¤erence is not crucial for considering the equilibria within the type space. Under imperfect commitment, when a principal contracts with an agent in period i, he is constrained to allocations that arise as Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the continuation game. Basically, when contracting in period i, the principal anticipates that he will react to the outcome of today's contract by o¤ering the best contract in period i + 1. Each period the principal anticipates that his di¤erent selves will behave optimally in the subsequent periods.
A similar situation arises when a number of principals contract sequentially with an agent. At each period i a principal P i anticipates that the subsequent principals P + i+1 will behave optimally given the state and information induced by its contract. Thus P i is constrained to allocations that arise as Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game between P + i+1 and A. One potential obstacle with replacing a general mechanism with a direct one is that out-of-equilibrium messages may be important to support the optimal mechanism. However, we show that this problem can be circumvented by preserving the allocations that arise out-of-equilibrium by the means of a direct mechanism.
To characterize the equilibria of the game, we proceed in the following steps. First we note that at stage N the standard Revelation Principle applies. At stage N 1 we apply the technique developed in Bester and Strausz (2001) to replace an original mechanism ( N 1 ; N 1 ) with an incentive feasible and payo¤ equivalent direct mechanism (
Also we show that when P N 1 o¤ers a direct mechanism, P N 2 and A do not deviate from the original equilibrium pro…le ( N 2 ; N 2 ) at stages 1; :::; N 2. By iterating the argument for all i = 1; :::; N , we conclude that the equilibria allocations of the original game with unrestricted message spaces can be characterized within a class of direct mechanisms.
It is straightforward to show that the standard Revelation Principle applies at stage N . At stage N 1; P N 1 faces a state (x N 2 ; p N 1 ) and anticipates that P N o¤ers a direct mechanism d N . To construct a direct mechanism at stage N 1, we …rst construct a direct mechanism for all types t 2 N 1 that reach stage N 1 with a positive probability. Then in Proposition 3 we extend it to the original message space :
Let us …rst focus on the set of types t 2 N 1 that reach the stage N 1 with a positive probability. Following Bester and Strausz (2001) , the direct mechanism ( N 1 , N 1 ) can be constructed in two steps. First step is to show that there exists an incentive feasible pro…le with a message space M 0 N 1 that contains at most T N 1 = j N 1 j messages and is payo¤ equivalent to the original pro…le. Second step is to apply the Marriage Theorem to the reduced message space and construct a direct mechanism (
The basic idea of Proposition 1 is that when P N 1 uses more messages than there are types, the vectors of the agent's reporting strategy under the original mechanism f h g must be linear dependent. Since the agent is indi¤erent between all the messages sent with a positive probability, without a¤ecting the incentives of A, P N 1 can distribute the weight from some messages so as to reduce the dimension of the message space to the type space. An important implication of Proposition 1 is that P N 1 does not need to use a message space of a dimension higher than the type space.
As an illustration, suppose that A can be one of two types, t 2 f ; g, and the original mechanism of P N 1 uses three messages fm 1 ; m 2 ; m 3 g. Proposition 1 states that there exists a reporting strategy 0 that supports a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and contains only two messages. The result trivially holds if some message in fm 1 ; m 2 ; m 3 g is sent with zero probability by both types. Suppose now that each message is in the support of at least some type. Consider vectors
where h (respectively, h ), h = 1; 2; 3 represents the probability that type (respectively, ) sends a message h. Since there are only two types, the vectors 1 ; 2 ; 3 are linearly dependent. So, there exists a non-zero vector = ( 1 ; 2 ; 3 ) 6 = 0 such that X h h h = 0.
For any given let us de…ne t 1 min h h and
Consider a new reporting strategy of the A to P N 1 such that
0 h ( t ; ) indeed constitutes a strategy of type t : 0 h ( t ; ) 0 and from condition (6) we obtain P h 0
is also an equilibrium under this mechanism. Indeed, a new reporting strategy 0 ( ) induces the same posterior beliefs for
It implies that the choice of N remains optimal for P N . Furthermore, since any message m h results in the same allocation of P N 1 and P N , the agent is indi¤erent between the two strategies.
The payo¤ of P N 1 under the new reporting strategy is maximized when A uses at most two messages. The payo¤ of P N 1 writes
and is linear in . Therefore, it is maximized by some 2 f t ; b g. Note that the strategy 0 ( ) is distinct from the original strategy since b < 0 < t . And by construction, under at least one message is sent with zero probability. Hence there exists a reporting strategy 0 ( ) that supports the same equilibrium as under the original mechanism and uses at most two messages. The next step is to use the reduced message space M 0 N 1 to construct a direct mechanism. The idea is to associate each message in M 0 N 1 with some type. We rely on the following theorem attributed to Hall (1935) .
Lemma 2 (Marriage theorem) Let H be a …nite non-empty set and K be a non-empty set, possibly in…nite. Further, let D : H ) K be a correspondence and for any set G H de…ne
Then there exists a mapping d :
This combinatorial results can be applied to our setting as follows. Take the set H to be the reduced message space M 0 N 1 . For each subset G of messages in H; D(G) denotes the set of types that send messages from G with a positive probability. The Marriage Theorem asserts that if the number of messages in G does not exceed the number of types that send messages from G with a positive probability, then there is a way to assign distinctively to each message a type that sends this message with a positive probability. Applying the results of Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 leads to the following proposition.
N 1 ) are payo¤ equivalent. Moreover, with the direct mechanism each type reports its private information with a positive probability,
The result of Proposition 2 is obtained in two steps. First, it can be veri…ed that the conditions of the Marriage Theorem are satis…ed for the reduced message space. Therefore, there exists a mapping d : M 0 N 1 ! N 1 that assigns a type to each message. Then this mapping can be inverted to associate each type with a message that it sends with positive probability. The inverted mapping can be used to construct a direct mechanism in which the reporting strategy is a probability that type i sends message j ; with the property that each type reports its private information with positive probability.
To complete the characterization, one has to extend the message space N 1 to the set of types that play at stage N 1 with zero probability. The mechanisms o¤ered to these types may be necessary to sustain the original equilibrium pro…le ( ; ): In the following proposition we extend the direct mechanism to the original message space and verify that this extension preserves the out-of-equilibrium allocations of ( ; ). Hence we conclude that the behavior of P N 2 and A does not change when they anticipate that P N 1 will o¤er a direct mechanism.
Proposition 3 For any incentive feasible
) are payo¤ equivalent.
Iterating the argument of Propositions 2 and 3 leads to the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 1
The result of Theorem 1 asserts that the equilibria of a game under public communication can be characterized within the class of direct mechanisms in which A reports its type with a positive probability. It reduces substantially the complexity of the problem. The game can be solved backwards. At each stage i P i o¤ers a direct mechanism that maximizes its payo¤ subject to (i) the behavior of the subsequent principals, (ii) the incentive compatibility constraints of the agent, and (iii) complementarity conditions on the reporting strategy that guarantee that the agent is indi¤erent among all the messages it sends with a positive probability.
Structure of the optimal mechanism
In general an optimal mechanism of P i is a lottery over F i . In this section we show that if a principal does not o¤er a stochastic contract in an isolated game, then an optimal contract in a multistage game is also deterministic. By an isolated stage game we mean a game played between a principal P i and an agent in the absence of the other principals P i : For any given x i , an optimal contract of this game can be characterized by a direct mechanism and it is a solution to the following program.
s:t: t 2 arg max
Proposition 4 If a principal P i o¤ers a deterministic contract in an isolated game 9, then for each message sent with a positive probability at stage i of a multistage game, P i assigns a deterministic allocation.
Proof. Consider a multistage game. An optimal contract of P i at stage i is a solution to the program
s:t: j;t 2 arg max
Since an isolated game an optimal contract is deterministic, for each message reported with a positive probability, an optimal contract of P i must also be deterministic. Indeed, it is an optimal choice of P i . Also it does not a¤ect beliefs of P + i+1 , and therefore the reporting strategy of the agent at stage i:
This simple result is very useful in applications. It states that at each stage a principal does not need to o¤er a contract that contains more allocations than the dimension of j i j : Strausz (2004) analyzes the conditions under which deterministic mechanism is optimal in an isolated stage game. He demonstrates that if an optimal deterministic mechanism does not involve bunching, then it is also optimal within a general class of stochastic mechanisms.
We apply the results of this section to characterize an optimal contract of the example of Section 2
Example. Under public communication, the report of A to P 1 is observed by P 2 . So, if the low cost supplier reports truthfully its type to P 1 ; P 2 infers perfectly the type of A and o¤ers a contract under full information. This policy is costly to P 1 who has to leave the low cost type the rent q 2 , where q 2 is the full information quantity o¤ered to high cost type at the second stage. By reducing the informativeness of the report of high cost supplier, P 1 will induce P 2 to introduce downward distortion of the output of this type, and consequently, decrease the rent paid to the low cost supplier. The optimal contract of P 1 thus consists of a menu of two allocations (t 1 ; q 1 ) and (t 1 ; q 1 ) and the following reporting strategies. A high cost type reports its true type with probability one. A low cost type reveals the true type with probability ; = Pr( e = ). P 1 assigns a contract (t 1 ; q 1 ) when A reports ; and (t 1 ; q 1 ) when A reports . When P 2 observes message , he infers that the supplier has low cost. When he observe the message , he holds beliefs
In the second stage, the low cost supplier produces the e¢ cient quantity q . The quantity of the high cost supplier is distorted downwards, but now the value of the distortion depends on the reporting strategy .
The lower is the ; the lower is the informativeness of message that the agent has high cost. As a result, the higher is the distortion of the quantity of the high cost type at the second stage.
The optimal contract of P 1 solves the program:
The last constraint CC is the complementarity condition. It states that when a low cost type is has a non-degenerate reporting strategy 6 = 1, it must be indi¤erent between messages and . Compared to the incentive constraint of under full separation (1), the incentive constraint IC of the above problem is relaxed because q 2 ( ) < q : However, introducing this noise is not costless. With probability 1 P 1 assigns an ine¢ cient production quantity q 1 to the e¢ cient supplier. An optimal contract trade-o¤s the bene…ts of a reduced rent with the e¢ ciency costs of the lottery. The incentive constraint IC 1 and the participation constraint P C 1 are the binding constraints. Then, the …rst order (su¢ cient) conditions with respect to q 1 , q 1 and imply:
The optimal lottery is determined by the last condition. The marginal cost of the lottery is the reduction in pro…ts of P 1 due to assigning an ine¢ cient production to the low cost supplier. The marginal bene…t is the decrease in the rent left to this type. Note that by o¤ering a lottery with < 1 P 1 increases the e¢ ciency of his contract compared to the full separation: q 1 > q . The optimal contract of P 1 is an intermediate case between no disclosure and full disclosure. It has a pooling feature in that observing the message leaves P 1 uncertain about the type of the supplier.
Private Communication

The Revelation Principle
The basic idea of the Revelation Principle is that a direct mechanism can replicate the distribution of outcomes of any indirect mechanism. This argument extends easily to the game with many principals under private communication. Indeed, when the message reported to a principal is not observed by the other principals, it cannot a¤ect the beliefs of these principals about agent's type. From the point of view of the agent, the whole game can be considered as a sequence of N games with N independent reporting strategies 1 ; :::; N . The link between these games is provided through the beliefs that a principal P i derives from observing the state x i 1 . Since replacing the original mechanism with a direct one in each single principal -agent relationship results in the same probability distribution over allocations, it leads to the same state structure. Therefore, the beliefs of P i+1 when P i plays a direct mechanism are the same as under the original mechanism. Each principal can thus innocuously replace its original mechanism with a direct one without a¤ecting the distribution over allocations and the information structure. Hence, a unilateral deviation of P i to a direct mechanism does not a¤ect the behavior of P i and the reporting strategy of A to P i . Iterating this argument for all i = 1; :::; N leads to the following result.
Theorem 2 In the game with private communication, for any equilibrium pro…le ( ; ) 2 P BE( ) there exists an incentive feasible direct mechanism d which is payo¤ equivalent to . Moreover, One interesting implication of Theorem 2 is that, even though the agent's private information at each stage i consists of the type and the messages sent to principals P i 1 , a principal P i does not need the information about these messages. In fact all the information that a principal needs for assigning a contract is the agent's report on its type.
Structure of the optimal mechanism
In contrast with most static principal -agent problems in which the "no bunching"property is a su¢ cient condition for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic (Strausz (2004) ), an optimal mechanism in the game with many principals is stochastic. The reason is that to control the information revealed to subsequent principals, the outcome of stage i must contain some noise about the agent's type. As shown in the simple example of Section 2, if P i o¤ers a deterministic contract, the principals P + i+1 contract with the agent under full information about the type. When revelation of information is costly, designing a stochastic contract will be optimal. In this section we show that the equilibria of the game under private communication can be characterized by a contract with a surprisingly simple structure: At each stage i the support of a stochastic contract contains at most j i j allocations.
In equilibrium, the optimal mechanism designed by principal P i , i , the mechanisms o¤ered by the subsequent principals, + i+1 ; the posterior beliefs, p i+1 must satisfy the following three conditions: (i) optimality of + i+1 ; (ii) optimality of agent's behavioral strategy, i;t ( t ) = 1 and
and (iii) Bayes rule (4) whenever possible. Then one can de…ne incentive feasible and incentive e¢ cient pro…les with respect to the support F i of the principal's optimal mechanism. We say that (x i 1 i ; p i+1 ;
) is a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium given mechanism ( i ; F i ). It is incentive e¢ cient if it is incentive feasible and there is no other incentive feasible mechanism (x i 1
and U i;t (x i 1 i ; p i+1 ;
Finally, the two pro…les are payo¤ equivalent when condition (12) holds and (11) is satis…ed as an equality. The logic of Bester and Strausz (2001) can now be applied to analyze the support F i of an incentive e¢ cient mechanism (x i 1 i ; p i+1 ; + i+1 F i ). We show that an incentive e¢ cient pro…le (x i 1 i ; p i+1 ; + i+1 F i ) can be replaced with a payo¤ equivalent
in which the support of 0 i consists of at most i allocations. We employ this result to establish that any PBE can be characterized by a payo¤ equivalent mechanism that uses at most j i j allocations at stage i, and for each type there is one distinct allocation that is assigned to this type with a positive probability.
Proposition 5
In a game with private communication, for any equilibrium mechanism i with the support F i there exists a payo¤ equivalent mechanism i with the support F i F i that contains at most j i j elements. When type t is assigned a non-degenerate lottery, it is indi¤erent among the allocations that are assigned to this type with a positive probability.
The structure of the proof is identical to the Revelation Principle under public communication. There, for any given equilibrium pro…le we considered a reporting strategy of the agent over a general message space. We have shown that replacing it with a strategy over the type space does not a¤ect the payo¤s and the beliefs of principals P + i+1 . Here, instead of studying the reporting strategy of the agent (which is a deterministic truthful revelation strategy), we focus on the mechanism o¤ered by the principal. We show that any mechanism that is part of PBE can be replaced with a payo¤ equivalent mechanism with …nite support. Moreover, this mechanism does not a¤ect optimal mechanisms of P + i+1 ; incentives of the agent and beliefs of subsequent principals. This is a general result that does not rely on any assumptions about the structure of payo¤ functions, like SpenceMirelees condition, for example. It is useful for applications because it provides a concrete way to characterize an optimal contract of a principal as a solution of an optimization problem under incentive constraints. We apply the results of this section to characterize the optimal mechanism under private communication for the example of Section 2.
Example: As in the case of public communication, the outcome of the contract of P 1 should be an imperfect signal when the agent has high cost. This way P 1 induces P 2 to reduce the quantity o¤ered to the high cost type, and ultimately decreases the rent paid to the low cost type in the …rst period. Therefore, the contract of P 1 has the following structure. Type is assigned a deterministic allocation (t 1 ; q 1 ); type is assigned a lottery between (t 1 ; q 1 ) and (t 1 ; q 1 ) with probabilities and 1 , respectively. When P 2 observes a contract (t 1 ; q 1 ); he infers that A is type. When P 2 observes the contract (t 1 ; q 1 ), it updates the beliefs to
In the latter case the output schedule of P 2 is the same as in the case of public communication (10) . At the …rst stage, P 1 chooses the contracts (t 1 ; q 1 ) and (t 1 ; q 1 ); and the lottery that solve the program.
The striking feature of the above program is that it is identical to the one under public communication. It turns out that in this example the observability of communication does not have any additional strategic e¤ect on the behavior of the players. Under either communication regime, P 1 controls the information that it transmitted to P 2 . Under private communication, the uncertainty about the type of agent is preserved by the stochastic structure of the contract o¤ered by P 1 . Under public communication, the uncertainty is preserved by the stochastic structure of the agent's reporting strategy. In the next section we show that this feature of equilibria is a general property that holds for any sequential common agency game.
Equivalence
In this section we note that the expected payo¤ of players and the distribution of allocations in equilibrium do not depend on communication mode. The basic idea of the result is that a principal can generate the same beliefs either by inducing a stochastic reporting strategy or by o¤ering a stochastic contract.
Consider a contract of principal P i under private communication. It consists of at most j i j distinct allocations fx i;1 ; :::; x i;j i j g and a distribution i;t (x i;j ) = Pr(x i;j j t ): Denote x i;t the allocation that is assigned to type t with a positive probability. Then an optimal contract of P i solves
The …rst constraint says that each type must weakly prefer an allocation associated with this type. The second constraint guarantees that an agent is indi¤erent among allocations in the support of the optimal stochastic contract.
Under public communications, a contract of P i consists of the set of allocations fx i;1 ; :::; x i;j i j g and reporting strategies for the agent i;t ( j ) = Pr( j j t ): Denote x i;j an allocation assigned when the agent reports message j . An optimal contract solves max t p i;t j i;t ( j )v i;t (x i 1 ; x i;j ; x + i+1 (x i;j ; p i+1 )) (14)
The …rst constraint guarantees that an agent weakly prefers to reveal his type. The second constraint states that an agent is indi¤erent among the messages sent with a positive probability.
It is straightforward to see that the two programs (13) and (14) are equivalent. Thus we obtain the following result.
Proposition 6
The equilibrium distribution of allocations and the expected payo¤ of the principals and the agent are independent of communication mode.
The implication of this result is that when the principal can o¤er stochastic contracts, the disclosure of information reported by a principal to the agent does not a¤ect the outcome of the game.
Extensions and Discussion
Non-persistent private information. The characterization results presented in the paper can also be extended to the environment where it is common knowledge that private information of an agent changes over time. When types are independent over time, the externality of the contract of one principal on the feasible set of the subsequent principals is conducted only through the choice of allocation. In this case under both communication modes the information is revealed with probability one at each contracting stage. A more interesting situation arises when private information of the agent is correlated over time. Technically, it is tedious but straightforward to show that in this case the equilibria can still be characterized within the type space. The only new feature is that the information about correlation of types should be incorporated into the de…nition of the Bayes rule.
Noisy observation of contract outcomes. The results can also be extended to the case where the outcome of contracting is observed with some exogenous noise. For example, one can assume that the subsequent principals observe a signal either about the message or about the implemented allocation, depending on communication mode. If information about the signal and precision of the signal is common knowledge, again, the results presented in the paper hold, but the Bayes rule should be adjusted for this information.
One interesting question that presents an avenue for further research is whether it is possible to obtain closed form solutions for a game with an arbitrary number of periods. So far the applications in the literature on imperfect commitment or sequential common agency mostly focused on two period models. One major obstacle that prevented extension of this literature to games with many periods is that it is not straightforward to understand which constraints are binding at each contracting stage. On the other side, control of information revealed by the contract to the other principals is the major reason why principals decide to implement stochastic contracts. The example studied in the paper provides good intuition about the structure of the pooling contract. In the example, it is costly for the …rst principal to implement a contract under which an e¢ cient agent's type is revealed with probability one. Thus, this type is partially pooled with an ine¢ cient one. This result also translates in the necessary condition on the set of binding incentive constraints: To be indi¤erent between the two contracts, the downward incentive constraint of the e¢ cient type must be binding. Thus, if all principals and the agent have the same ordering of types, the constraints will be binding downwards. Another ob-servation is that this structure implies that following each implemented contract the set of types assigned a positive probability is weakly decreasing. These observation suggest that recursive methods developed by Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990), Phelan and Townsend (1991) and Marcet and Marimon (1998) could be extended to study adverse selection problem of the type we addressed in the paper.
Conclusion
The paper characterizes the direct mechanisms for sequential common agency games. We show that when the outcome of contracting with one principal is observed by the other principals, the equilibria of the game can be characterized within the type space. We distinguish between the cases of private and public communication. Under private communication, the message that the agent submits to one principal is not observed by the other principals. In this case the standard version of the Revelation Principle holds: The equilibrium of the game can be characterized within the class of direct mechanisms in which the agents reports truthfully its type to each principal. However, the contract is in general stochastic. We also show that the size of the support of the stochastic contract does not need to exceed the number of types that occur with a positive probability at this stage. When communication between the principal and the agent is public, that is, observed by the other principals, the equilibria of the game can also be characterized within the class of direct mechanisms. However, the requirement on the revelation of private information by the agent is weaker than in the classical case, and occurs with a positive probability. We also show that in equilibrium the two communication modes lead to the same distribution of allocations.
The characterization results that we present in the paper allow to formulate the contracting problem as a solution of an optimization problem where a principal needs to select a …nite number of allocations and a lottery over this support of allocations. The results also extend to the cases when the private information of the agent is not persistent or the subsequent principals observes the outcomes of previous stages with some noise.
There are some questions that need further investigation. The most interesting one is to understand whether under some ordering assumptions on the type space, like SpenceMirelees condition, an optimal contract can be formulated as a recursive problem.
Appendix Public Communication Proof of Proposition 1
To prove proposition 1, we derive the …rst order conditions implied by incentive e¢ -ciency in the following lemma. Then we apply the result of the lemma to establish the main result of Proposition 1.
almost everywhere.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let K = fK 1 ; :::; K k ; :::g be a partition of M N 1 : Then for any = ( 1 ; :::; k ; :::) such that
we can de…ne a new reporting strategy
Next we prove that incentive feasibility of (
Therefore,
Hence, 0 N 1;t maximizes A's expected payo¤ and satis…es (3)
and the consistency with the Bayes rule is satis…ed.
Incentive e¢ ciency of (x N 2 ; N 1 ; p N ; N 1 M N 1 ) implies that = (1; :::; 1; :::) maximizes this payo¤ subject to (15) . Therefore, there exists N 1 = ( N 1;1 ; :::; N 1;T N 1 ) 2 R T N 1 such that 0 satis…es the …rst order condition:
for all k. By the Bayes rule (5), this condition is identical to X
for all K k 2 K. Since the above condition (18) must hold for any arbitrary partition K on M N 1 , we obtain the result of the Lemma.
Proof of the main result of Proposition 1. Note that by conditions (3) and (5) [
Indeed, suppose there is an
for all m 2 H: Then (5) 
Second,
Since N 1 (M ) = 1 implies N 1;t (M ) = 1; it follows form the Bayes rule that
where p N (m) = (p N;t (m)) t2 N 1 :
De…ne P = fp(m) j m 2 M g and let co(P ) denote the convex hull of P . By a theorem of Rubin and Wester (1958) , (21) implies that p N 2 2 co(P ): Since co(P ) lies in the hyperplane fp 2 R T N 1 j i p i = 1g; it may be represented as a set in R T N 1 1 . Therefore, by Caratheodory's theorem, p N 2 can be written as a convex combination of jM 0 j T N 1 linearly independent vectors p(m 1 ); :::; p(m jM 0 j ) in P . Thus there exists = ( 1 ; :::
Consider a message set M 0 = fm 1 ; :::; m jM 0 j g associated with vectors p(m 1 ); :::; p(m jM 0 j ) and de…ne a new reporting strategy for the agent by setting
By ( 
Let us denote R
. Therefore, by Lemma 3 and
we obtain Z
By the Bayes rule (5),
Thus the inequality (24) De…ne the correspondence D : 
Now we replace the mechanism (M 0
) that is de…ned in the following way:
Note that d N 1;t ( j ) > 0 for all t 2 N 1 . Thus, to complete the proof it is su¢ cient to show that (x N 2 ; 
Thus, under the direct mechanism the optimality of the reporting strategy of A and the Bayes rule are satis…ed, so it is incentive feasible.
P N and A do not deviate from the original strategy (
it induces the same decision with the same probability,
is an optimal mechanism of P N 1 ; and replacing the original equilibrium pro…le ( N 1 ; N 1 ) does not change the optimal choice of P N and A at stage N; we conclude that (
Proof of Proposition 3. In Proposition 2 we establish the result for N 1 : Consider a type j 2 n N 1 : From the support of the original strategy N 1;j select some message m 2 M N 1 : De…ne the direct mechanism of P N 1 as 0 N 1 ( j ) = N 1 (m) and a reporting strategy of the agent N 1;t ( e ) = 1; if e = t ; 0; otherwise.
Let the posterior belief be the same as the belief for the message m;
The reporting strategy of the agent is optimal because by reporting its type it induces the same decision as by sending the message m: The posterior belief upon observing message j is the same as upon observing message m: So we conclude that this extension preserve the distribution over allocations of the original pro…le ( N 1 ; N 1 ) also for outof-equilibrium types. Consequently, when P N 1 o¤ers a direct mechanism, P N 2 and A at preceding stages 1; :::; N 2 do not deviate from the original equilibrium pro…le ( N 2 ; N 2 ).
Private Communication
The Revelation Principle
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider an equilibrium pro…le ( ; ) of = ( ; M ): For some
and a reporting strategy of A i is an optimal reporting strategy for the agent. Suppose the reverse. Then there exists a reporting strategy e i : ! , with e i ( e j ) > 0 at least for some e 6 = , such that A obtains higher expected payo¤ by manipulating its report according to e i :
This condition is equivalent to
which contradicts optimality of i : Thus,
Furthermore, the pro…le (
and it contradicts that ( ; ) is an equilibrium pro…le. Thus, the direct mechanism (
In the next two steps we show that the original pro…le ( i ; i ) remains optimal for P i and A.
Step 3. Since d i induces the same probability distribution over allocations F i (x i 1 ) and the same posterior beliefs p i , in the continuation game starting at i + 1 it remains optimal for P + i+1 and A to follow (
Step 4. To sustain the original equilibrium ( i 1 ; i 1 ), it may be necessary to preserve the out-of-equilibrium messages in i . Note that in the direct mechanism d i these messages are replicated through the allocations assigned to the out-of-equilibrium types with p i 1;t = 0. As the direct mechanism d i induces the same probability distribution over the allocations for all types, including the out-of-equilibrium ones, then the optimal contract of any P k , k < j when anticipating d i is the same as when anticipating i . Similarly, the reporting strategy of A to P k when anticipating a direct mechanism of P i is the same as when anticipating the original mechanism i . Therefore, ( i 1 ; i 1 ) remains optimal for P i 1 and A.
Step 5. Iterating the argument for all i = 1; :::; N; we conclude that a pro…le (
of direct mechanisms and incentive compatible communication strategies is incentive ef…cient.
Step 6. The pro…le of direct mechanisms ( d ; d ) induces the sequence of beliefs and the probability distribution over allocations x 2 X which are equivalent to the that of the original pro…le ( ; ): Therefore, ( ; ) and
Proof of Lemma 1. Given the reporting strategy N and the mechanism N of the original equilibrium pro…le, let us de…ne a direct mechanism and a reporting strategy of the agent as
For all types t 2 N , by the standard argument of the Revelation Principle, the pro…le ( N ; N ) is incentive feasible and payo¤ equivalent to ( N ; N ). To verify that P N 1 and A do not deviate form ( N 1 ; N 1 ) , note that the out-of-equilibrium mechanisms that may be necessary to sustain ( ; ) are replicated in the direct mechanism ( 
Structure of the optimal mechanism
In the following lemma we derive the …rst order conditions implied by incentive e¢ ciency. Then we apply the result of the lemma to establish that an original mechanism can be replaced by a payo¤ equivalent mechanism that employs at most N 1 allocations. Incentive e¢ ciency of ( N 2 ; p N 1 ; N 1 ; N X N 1 ) implies that = (1; :::; 1; :::) maximizes this payo¤ subject to (27). Therefore, there exists N 1 = ( N 1;1 ; :::; N 1;T N 1 ) 2 R T N 1 such that 0 satis…es the …rst order condition:
Bayes rule (4) implies that this condition is equivalent to
for all K k 2 K. Since the above condition holds for any arbitrary partition K on F N 1 , we obtain the result of the Lemma. Since N 1 (X N 1 ) = 1 implies N 1;t (X N 1 ) = 1; the Bayes rule implies that Z
where p N 1 (x N 1 ) = (p N 1;t (x N 1 ))
T N 1 t=1 : De…ne P = fp(x N 1 ) j x N 1 2 X N 1 g and let co(P ) denote the convex hull of P . By a theorem of Rubin and Wester (1958) , it follows from (33) that p N 1 2 co(P ): Since co(P ) lies in the hyperplane fp 2 R T N 1 j i p i = 1g; it may be represented as a set in R 0 N 1 ; N F N 1 ) are payo¤ equivalent. Therefore, for any incentive e¢ cient mechanism with an arbitrary support there exists a payo¤ equivalent mechanism that employs at most j N 1 j allocations.
